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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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| SUBJECT | Democratic Republic of Vietnam Infiltration of Vietnamese National Army | DATE DISTR. | 31 August 1953 | |
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| | | REFERENCES | | |

1. Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) infiltration of the Vietnamese National Army has created an extremely grave situation. DRV agents who have already infiltrated Vietnamese nationalist military organizations such as the National Army, Union Forces, and the National Guard have recently received the following order:
 - a. Sow terror among the population to provoke confusion and undermine the prestige of the National Army.
 - b. Create discord between different military units and provoke armed brawls between these units.
 - c. Cause misunderstandings between military and civil organizations.
2. The following incidents are examples of the disorder caused by DRV agents who have infiltrated Vietnamese ranks:
 - a. On 18 April 1953, two days before the attack on Kien An Province, there were armed brawls between the Commandos and the Engineers.
 - b. On 23 April 1953, there were brawls at Thai Binh between the 58 BVN and the 5 ERVN during the course of which two grenades were thrown.
 - c. On 22 April 1953, there were brawls at Thai Binh between elements of the 5 ERVN during which ten enlisted men tried to stab a radio sergeant.
3. The DRV has carried on propaganda activities since the beginning of hostilities.¹ During the past six months the DRV has intensified this campaign and mobilized all governmental organizations behind it. The DRV fears the realization of a successful conscription system by the National Government and the "rising of Vietnamese against Vietnamese."

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4. The current situation created by DRV infiltration tactics urgently requires energetic measures by the Vietnamese Government. Two suggested measures are as follows:
- a. The transfer of entire military units from North to South and from South to North to break up, at least temporarily, DRV nets within these units. After these shifts, it would be more difficult for the DRV to reestablish and maintain contact with its nets within Vietnamese units thus shifted.
 - b. Measures should be taken to uncover DRV nets. In addition, a propaganda campaign against such activity should be launched throughout the National Army as a long-range solution to the problem.

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☐ Comment. It is regrettable that the present system of mobilization and recruitment for the National Army does not take into account the ease with which DRV agents can infiltrate the army.

1. ☐ Comment. Source probably refers to the campaign conducted against mobilization, conscription, and the formation of a "puppet" army.

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